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Rules have been defined, within behavior analysis and without, as stimuli that 
“refer to” or “specify” contingencies or environmental events (e.g., “Hold the base 
firmly and turn the top to the right,” Skinner, 1969, p. 139). Ribes-Iñesta1 (2000) 
suggests that the approach to rules and rule-governed behavior that developed from 
Skinner’s (1969) work leads to conceptual confusion. Specifically, he proposes 
that confusion results from the lack of a distinction between rules as stimuli and 
rules as outcomes. Although such a distinction may be necessary, Ribes-Iñesta 
does not address the referential or specifying nature of rules and, consequently, 
fails to provide useful definitions of rules as either verbal stimuli or responses. 
In the first part of this response, we will outline the approach to rules and 
instructions provided by Ribes-Iñesta’s article. In the latter half, we will point out 
the limitations of the definitions of rules and instructions that Ribes-Iñesta 
proposes and, more specifically, how the inadequate definitions of rules and 
instructions result from the failure to address the referential nature of rules as 
verbal stimuli or responses. Finally, we suggest that a consideration of Ribes-
Iñesta’s article draws attention to reference as a critical property of rules and rule-
governed behavior. 
 
Ribes-Iñesta’s Proposed Redefinition of Rules and Instructions 
 
Ribes-Iñesta suggests that the approach to rules suggested by Skinner is not 
clear. More specifically, he points out that a distinction must be made between 
“rules” that are “constructed as verbal stimuli that describe consequences” and 
“rules” as “instructions to be followed to cope with a set of already specified 
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contingencies” (p. 44). The former “rules” are the “outcome” of understanding, 
“which entails being a listener and an observer of one’s own effective behavior” 
(p. 44) such as “When I walk in the rain, I get wet.” In the latter case, however, 
“effective performance is expected to follow from the cueing and restrictions 
provided by the demonstration and/or instructions” (p. 44) as in “Do not walk in 
the rain because you will get wet.” We agree with Ribes-Iñesta that in each of 
these situations, the events referred to as rules are functionally different. In the first 
situation, the “rule” is a response, in that the form of the “rule” is controlled by 
exposure to environmental (“match to sample type”) contingencies (“When I walk 
in the rain I get wet” is a speaker’s response to directly experienced environmental 
contingencies). In the second situation, the “rule” is a stimulus, in that it controls 
the range of behavior emitted in the situation (“Do not walk in the rain because 
you will get wet” aims to restrict the behavior of a listener). In other words, Ribes-
Iñesta argues that contingency specifying stimuli may function as both rules (i.e., 
responses to environmental contingencies) and instructions (i.e., stimuli that limit 
another’s behavior), and we must make a clear distinction between these two 
functional categories. 
In order to address the foregoing concerns, Ribes-Iñesta suggests that we: 
 
reserve the term “rule” for verbal descriptions of previously experienced 
contingencies, and the term “instruction” for those cases of rule-following 
behavior in which the individual has not experienced the contingencies that gave 
rise to the rule in the first place. (p. 49) 
 
This distinction avoids the confusion that occurs when rules are used to refer both 
to stimuli presented to a subject and to responses established by training. However, 
although this definition addresses one particular aspect of the current approach to 
rule governance, we contend that Ribes-Iñesta underestimates the problems that 
arise when rules and instructions are used as functional terms. 
 
Ribes-Iñesta’s Approach to Rules and Rule-Following 
 
According to Ribes-Iñesta (p. 45-46), “at least three requirements must be 
satisfied in order to identify some given behavior as rule-following.” These are: 
 
1) the specific physical stimulus properties that can acquire a discriminative 
function should vary within the particular contingency situation 
2) the putative rule-governed behavior should be the result of abstract stimulus 
control that emerges from an interaction with matching-to-sample kind of 
contingencies 
3) verbal descriptions of functional contingencies may be an additional outcome 
of abstraction themselves 
 
Ribes-Iñesta proposes that the responses referred to in #2 (above) constitute 
the abstraction of relational functional properties (e.g., consistent responding 
according to an “oddity” criterion, p. 53). At this point, Ribes-Iñesta suggests that 
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such a performance is an example of rule-following and that the verbal 
descriptions in #3 (above) are the result of “rule description.” As an aside, if we 
describe the behavior in #2 (above) as rule-following, it seems as though rule-
following may occur without rule-description (i.e., #3 above) and, thus, rule-
following may occur in the absence of a verbalized rule (e.g., when a nonverbal 
organism demonstrates identity matching). 
The critical oversight in Ribes-Iñesta’s description of rule-description or 
construction is that he does not address how the verbal descriptions in #3 (above) 
refer or relate functionally to the performances suggested in #2 (above). This 
oversight leads to several deficiencies in the above account of rule-following. First, 
exposure to contingencies alone is not sufficient to produce descriptions of those 
contingencies because, as noted by Ribes-Iñesta (p. 46, 51), the contingencies that 
give rise to verbal responses that “refer” to environmental events are additional to 
those environmental events (i.e., people often do not verbalize the contingencies 
that control their behavior). Second, the contingencies that give rise to verbal 
responses that “refer” to environmental events may not simply be additional to 
those environmental events but may, in fact, control such verbal responses in the 
absence of those environmental events. The verbal response “if you are good, 
when you die you will go to heaven” emphasizes how far removed verbal behavior 
may be from environmental events and still describe contingencies. Third, verbal 
contingencies may lead to descriptions of contingencies that are different to those 
environmental events to which a subject is exposed. For example, subjects that 
respond quickly when exposed to fixed-interval schedules without instructions 
describe the contingencies as ratio-based (Leander, Lippman, & Meyer, 1968; 
Lowe, 1979). 
Ribes-Iñesta does not outline exactly what additional contingencies may give 
rise to verbal descriptions that refer to contingencies. Rather, he suggests that 
“such descriptions are related to theoretical notions such as the abstract tact 
(Skinner, 1957), contingency substitutional behavior (Ribes, 1991), and 
contingency specifying stimuli (Schlinger & Blakely, 1987)” (p. 51). Therefore, on 
the one hand, Ribes-Iñesta suggests that effective behavior and rule construction 
“are under the control of different variables and have different functions” (p. 46), 
but on the other, he does not make explicit exactly what these “different variables” 
are. 
 
Ribes-Iñesta’s Approach to Instructions 
 
Ribes-Iñesta’s description of instructions is unclear. Ribes-Iñesta suggests that 
“Instructions selectively expose the individual to a partial set of contingencies, 
relative to those that gave rise to the instructions in the first place” (p. 50). He 
explains this effect thus: “Instructing can be conceived as a special case of 
prompting-shaping in which the relevant, expected behavior is initially prompted 
by the instruction” (p. 49). Prompts are defined as “supplementary stimuli that 
increase the likelihood of already existing behavior” (Skinner, 1957, p. 52). 
Instructions can, therefore, be described as stimuli that restrict a range of 
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responding and make a particular behavior more likely. Such a definition is not 
sufficient insofar as it does not distinguish between rules and other stimuli that 
have similar effects (e.g., discriminative stimuli, conditional stimuli). Finally, 
although Ribes-Iñesta does suggest possible effects of instructions, he does not 
suggest a history of reinforcement that would give rise to such performances and 
thus his treatment of instructions falls short of a complete functional-analytic 
definition. 
In short therefore, Ribes-Iñesta’s approach to instructions fails to address the 
referential nature of verbal stimuli. At no point does Ribes-Iñesta seek to outline 
the history of reinforcement that is necessary for verbal stimuli to control 
subsequent nonverbal behavior. In order for instructions to control nonverbal 
responding they must “refer” to nonverbal contingencies. That is, if one does not 
know what an instruction refers to, one cannot follow it (e.g., if an instruction is in 
a different language). Ribes-Iñesta does not address this vital aspect of 
instructional control from a functional analytic perspective. Until we have a clear 
functional analytic treatment of terms such as reference, specify, prompt, and so 
on, any definition of rules and instructions will be, at best, incomplete and, at 




Ribes-Iñesta distinguishes between rules as verbal stimuli and verbal 
responses. This is an important distinction in that we, as behavior analysts, may 
have heretofore described and defined functionally dissimilar events as rules. It is 
clear, however, that Ribes-Iñesta does not provide definitions of rules or 
instructions that address the referential nature of rules as either verbal stimuli or 
verbal responses. More specifically, Ribes-Iñesta does not propose a particular 
history of reinforcement that would lead to either the production of a verbal 
response that refers to a nonverbal event or to the control of nonverbal behavior 
established by a verbal stimulus that refers to a nonverbal event. In order to 
develop a coherent approach to rules, we must endeavor to isolate the variables 
that generate referential relations themselves. Indeed, several researchers have 
taken advantage of recent work on derived relational responding in proposing 
functional-analytic definitions of verbal behavior that also adequately address the 
concept of reference in functional analytic terms (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Cullinan, 2000; Chase & Danforth, 1991; Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Horne & 
Lowe, 1996; Sidman, 1994; Skinner, 1986). These approaches to verbal behavior 
may provide the first steps to a functional-analytic approach to rules and rule-
governed behavior that also addresses the important referential nature of such 
stimuli and responses. 
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